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Professor Perry here appeals to knowledge of past and future objects and events as the crucial support of his denial of the real efficacy of thought. At the same time he contends that past and future objects and events have as real an existence as the present. I am not prepared to discuss this point in detail, but shall say that *if* they do so exist and can enter into new relation with each other and with the present, then they must be subject to modification in the same sense as the present.

In concluding Professor Perry says: "It seems absurd to contend that knowledge makes the world." But who has so contended? The pragmatist's contention is that knowledge *helps* to make, in the sense of assisting in remaking, the world. Professor Perry concedes, however, that "knowledge does make *its* world." "It may even be said to make *our* world. But there is a tremendous significance, practical, philosophical and religious, in this difference between our world and *the* world." In appreciation of this "tremendous significance" the pragmatist would yield to no one. Indeed, it was by just this "tremendous significance" that the pragmatist was conceived and brought forth. But for him this "tremendous significance" is that in so far as the distinction between *our* world ("our" including all conscious beings) and *the* world is widened by just so far the abyss of phenomenalism and skepticism is opened.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

A Primer of General Method. Being an Introduction to Educational Theory and Practise on the Basis of Logic. Sidney Edward Lang. Toronto: The Clark Co. 1906. Pp. x + 224.

This volume, as its subtitle indicates, is a consideration of the bearing of logic upon educational theory and practise. It is especially designed for instruction in normal schools, and is evidently written with this end in view. The author has succeeded through clear statement and suggestive illustration in sustaining the interest of the reader throughout. His discussion of the theory of logic is given in simple language relieved of all technical terminology and formal rules. The subject-matter of the book is divided into four parts: Part I., The General Nature of Knowledge; Part II., Judgment and Inference; Part III., Systems and System-making; Part IV., Concrete Problems of Education. To the main body of the work there is appended a set of questions and exercises.

The author's point of view is that of unqualified pragmatism. An adequate criticism of his theories would involve a complete review of the principles of pragmatism, which it would be out of place to attempt here. However, there are several structural weaknesses of the pragmatist's position which seem especially emphasized when revealed in the discussion of logical theory. For it is in the grounding of sound logical doctrine that the pragmatist's plausibility fails to carry conviction, and the impression is left that his efforts in this field are merely a brilliant *tour de force*. Mr. Lang recognizes as one of the cardinal doctrines of his theory of logic, the systematic necessity of judgment. He says (p. 58): "We often say, 'I am forced to the conclusion that so and so is the case.' The *ground,* that is, as we have just said, the way in which the parts are related in the system within which we are judging, compels us to state results or conclusions which may indeed in certain cases be unwelcome. For the reason, then, that we judge not as we wish, but as we must, judgment is said to be *necessary.*" Now the element in this feeling of compulsion which expresses logical necessity is free of all pragmatic sanction. Given certain data, we are constrained to expect certain results. When put to the test of experimental verification, and the results do not materialize as we had been led by the process of inference to expect, we do not challenge the integrity of our logical faculty, but at once proceed to re-examine our original data. That the consequent *must* follow, if its proper antecedent is given, is a statement of logical necessity, and as a constant and universal expression of the logical necessities attending every form of inference, it swings clear of all pragmatic variability. The question as to whether a given antecedent is properly connected with a certain consequent is quite a different one.

Again, in the author's treatment of the subject of hypotheses, he makes the following assumption: "Whatever hypothesis we form in a given set of circumstances is formed under the consciousness that we must act in some way." This would seem to be a very narrow view to take of the great world of knowledge. Take some of the famous hypotheses of science, the nebular hypothesis, the theory of gravitation, the Copernican theory, the theory of evolution, or the theory regarding the ebb and flow of the tides. To connect any one of these hypotheses with the practical needs of man, as regards either the history of its origin or its present pragmatic significance, would be a most unnatural and strained procedure. The view that the earth is stationary and that the sun actually rises and sets, is a far more useful, convenient and practical idea than the Copernican theory. It works, and works so completely that our language has never been altered to square with the wider range of new knowledge. For the astronomer it does not work. Let him satisfy himself with a different theory; but for the practical man it stands the pragmatic test most adequately. Again, Mr. Lang speaks of the necessity of "organizing into a systematic whole of each bit of knowledge that we possess" (p. 48). Now, while each bit of knowledge may have a practical value which is obvious, it is impossible to have before us as a conscious methodological procedure the practical ends involved in the systematic whole. Such a whole is too complex to reveal its ends even in an insignificant degree. We can not construct part to part, and adapt part to the whole, according as we are guided by our knowledge of the ends which the complex nature of the whole implies.

We construct our body of knowledge on simpler lines and by simpler methods. We follow the lead not of far-off and concealed ends, but rather of the nature of the separate parts as they are in themselves, and as related to each other. The most useful functions of these various bits of knowledge are often revealed only after they have been long stored in the memory, and then by some happy chance or by a combination of circumstances never before occurring. The author, moreover, regards the disjunctive judgment as expressing the nature of a system, "not in its relation to anything else, but as a self-related whole with an individuality of its own" (p. 81). Here is certainly one logical form at least which is not concerned with the adjustment of means to ends, and of practical values, but exhibits that which is an end in itself. Concerning a comprehensive knowledge of such systems, is not the question, naturally, "What is it?" rather than, "What am I to do with it?"—the latter, according to Mr. Lang, being the attitude of mind which is essential to any true method of acquiring knowledge. It is certain that progress in science has been characterized in a peculiar sense by a freedom from an exclusive consideration of practical ends. If the curiosity of searchers after truth had been confined to the investigation of the phenomena of nature and of life for the sake of discovering practical values solely, the world of knowledge would be sadly diminished in extent and significance, and even the practical needs of man would be less adequately and less admirably supplied. To cite but a single instance, it was a purely speculative interest which led such men as Henry and Faraday to devote their lives to the study of electricity and magnetism. Theirs was no compulsion of utility, but an all-absorbing desire, a passion, indeed, to know things as they are. Yet out of their researches have come the vast array of electromagnetic inventions which have contributed so incalculably to the welfare and comfort of mankind. How often the practical value of a truth appears unexpectedly, like a by-product, which direct research would never have revealed.

As regards the author's application of his doctrine to the theory of education, the same pragmatic strain is visible throughout. He insists that the teacher should be ever mindful "that the only reason we have for getting knowledge is that it enables us to do things more efficiently, and that knowledge is valuable only so far as it is a guide to right action" (p. 172). This ideal also, he insists, should be early inculcated in the pupil's mind and never lost sight of at any moment of his study. Mr. Lang throughout confuses the two ideas of being interested in what one is studying and being interested in the practical utility which the subject-matter may possess. It is possible, and, indeed, essential, in my opinion, that the interest of the student should be stimulated by the rich material which certain subjects contain as an end in itself, and not always as a mere means to some practical end which it serves to accomplish. If the child has early impressed upon his mind that utility is the sole motive in the acquisition of knowledge, and if he lives in such an atmosphere through the formative period of his life, there will inevitably follow a dwarfing both of his intellectual powers and of his character. Truly there is enough of commanding interest in the study of nature, of bird and animal life, of trees and flowers, of the marvelous phenomena of physical science, of chemistry and astronomy, of the events of history and the various creations of human thought and fancy. The child naturally can become so charmed by the beauty and mystery of the world of wonders about him that he will early learn to value certain kinds of knowledge, at least for their own sake. It is true that knowledge is power, but that should not be ever held out to the child as an alluring bait. Knowledge can compel homage and devotion without stooping to offer a bribe, or to cry the value of its wares in the street. I would also urge the consideration of those indirect uses of knowledge which can never be consciously before pupil or teacher in the process of instruction. They are too subtle, too far-off in their effects, too complex, too cumulative for any one to detect, and name, and tabulate. They can not be pointed to as the obvious reward of industry in learning lessons and keeping one's copy-book neat and clean. I refer to what may be called the atmosphere of knowledge, the fine flavor of thought, the sound reason and right judgment which characterize richly stored minds. If a child is interested solely in what can be pointed out to him as serving some useful practical purpose, he will be very poorly equipped as regards both his available fund of knowledge and his skill to use it in the face of some emergency or of a wholly new and unfamiliar experience. This, then, is the paradox of knowledge, that he who regards knowledge as a mere servant is never completely master of it, but he who regards himself as the servant of knowledge is alone master in the realm of thought.

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Practise and Science of Religion: A Study of Method in Comparative Religion. JAMES HAUGHTON WOODS. New York: Longmans, Green & Co. 1906. Pp. viii + 123.

This little book consists of six lectures, developed under the influence of Kaftan, Harnack and Windelband, delivered at the General Theological Seminary in New York, and "given to the search for positive ground common to many religions" (p. viii).

It is first pointed out that the rise of a *new* science of religion is quite parallel to the development in other phases of life (practise, art, science), whose tendency is to bring problems and assumptions to the test of personal experience rather than attempt their solution by the traditional and *a priori* methods; that yet extreme individualism and impressionism must be corrected by getting our experiences into some order and system and by the discovery of a single standard of relative values; and that the point of view of the science of religion is the same as that of all modern sci-